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Rethinking Professor Westbrook's Two 
Thoughts About Insider Preferences 
Peter A. Alces* 
Even the most powerful, most secure creditor interests fear 
the operation of the fraudulent disposition provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code.1 Large institutional creditors have reason to 
be anxious when the trustee in bankruptcy may interpose a six-
teenth-century theory2 to frustrate their best laid plans. 
• Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of Wil-
liam and Mary. I am indebted to my colleagues Jayne Barnard, Charles Koch, 
and Harold See for their thoughtful comments on a draft of this manuscript. I 
also acknowledge the thorough and careful work of my research assistant, 
Karen J. Smith, J.D. 1993, The College of William and Mary. Deficiencies of 
the finished product, however, remain the fault of the author. 
1. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1988) (''Preferences" & "Fraudulent trans-
fers and obligations"). Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code also provides 
the trustee in bankruptcy the right to utilize state law in order to recover 
property for the bankruptcy estate. Id. § 544(b). The trustee could use state 
uniform fraudulent disposition law, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 
7A U.L.A. 427 (1985) [hereinafter U.F.C.A.], or Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985) [hereinafter U.F.T.A.], when to do so would permit 
the trustee to reach transfers not within the scope of the Bankruptcy Code 
fraudulent transfer or preference provisions. 
To the extent that the states retain bulk sales law under Article Six of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the trustee may also prosecute a bulk sales action 
on behalf of the estate. For a discussion of the affinity between the fraudulent 
transfer and bulk sales law, see Peter A. Alces, Fraud Bases of Bulk Trans-
feree Liability, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 679 (1990). 
2. Scholars generally trace fraudulent disposition law in the United 
States to the English Statute of 13 Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571). The Eliza-
bethan legislation was essentially criminal in nature, proscribing transfers ef-
fected with "intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others of their 
just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties, forfeitures, 
heriots, mortuaries, and reliefs." Id. § 1. That "actual intent" proscription is 
continued in the U.F.C.A. (§ 7), U.F.T.A. (§ 4(a)(1)), and the Bankruptcy Code 
(11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1)(1988)). 
The decision of Star Chamber in Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. SOb, 76 Eng. 
Rep. 809 (1601), established the so-called ''badges of fraud," which essentially 
converted actual intent to defraud under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth into what 
has become contemporary constructive fraudulent disposition law. Though 
scholars generally recognize Twyne's Case as a fraudulent conveyance decision, 
in fact it was a preference decision. See Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the 
Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REv. 505, 513 (1977) ("[O]ne of 
605 
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One of the latest causes of secured lenders' disquiet is 
Judge Frank Easterbrook's opinion for the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. 3 
Though the individuals involved and the facts are, to say the 
least, intemperate,4 it is the stark holding of the case that lend-
ers and their counsel find most chilling. Levit construed Bank-
ruptcy Code section 550(a)(l) to provide the trustee5 with the 
right to recover payments made to a lender within one year of 
the debtor's bankruptcy6 when those payments effectively re-
duce the exposure of an insider-guarantor. For reasons that 
make sense in terms of statutory semantics, but do not make 
good commercial sense, the recovery theory is available only if 
the insider is a creditor of the debtor with regard to the guar-
anty.7 Credito::.' status is generally established by suretyship 
law, which provides that a secondary obligor (i.e., the guaran-
tor) may recover from the principal obligor (debtor) when the 
secondary obligor satisfies the debt of the principal to the obli-
gee, the lender.s 
Most of the commentary responding to Levit has not been 
the great ironies of legal history is that Twyne's Case, which is widely regarded 
as the fountainhead of the modem Anglo-American law of fraudulent convey-
ances, does not, as presented in the reports, clearly involve anything more 
than a preference."). 
Commentators have questioned the continued vitality of these sixteenth-
century commercial principles. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, 
Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 V AND. L. REv. 829, 
852 (1985) ("A firm that incurs obligations in the course of a buyout does not 
seem at all like the Elizabethan deadbeat who sells his sheep to his brother for 
a pittance."). 
3. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Corp.) 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). 
4. "As the investigation continued and Deprizio's [the insider-guaran-
tor's] indictment was imminent, word circulated that he might 'sing.' So in 
January 1986 Deprizio was lured to a vacant parking lot, where an assassin's 
gun and the obligations of a lifetime were discharged together. Corporations 
are not so easily liquidated." Id. at 1187. 
5. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1988) (providing that the "debtor in posses-
sion" may act in lieu of a § 322 (Id. § 322) trustee). Reference to the trustee in 
this article includes as well the qualified debtor in possession. 
6. The trustee may avoid transfers that prefer an insider for the full year 
before the bankruptcy. Id. § 101(31) (Supp. III 1991) (defining insider). See id. 
§ 547(b)(4)(B). 
7. See id. § 547(b)(1) (providing that the "trustee may avoid any transfer 
to or for the benefit of a creditor"). See also irifra notes 66-73 and accompany-
ing text (explaining the creditor requirement in greater detail). 
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 14 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 
1992): 
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supportive of either the opinion's policy analysis9 or conclu-
sion.10 Recently, in the pages of the Minnesota Law Review, 
Professor Jay Westbrook wrote a qualified defense of Levit.H 
He recognizes the concerns of Judge Easterbrook's critics but 
argues nonetheless that with certain limitations the logic of the 
decision can be made to work. Westbrook endeavors to distin-
guish among insider guaranties, to urge the commercial efficacy 
of one type but not the other, and then to explain how Levit, 
apparently fortuitously, accommodates this discrimination.12 
He also engages the curious requirement that the insider be a 
creditor of the debtor and discovers serendipity in that accident 
(2) The right to require the principal obligor to perform the un-
derlying obligation or bear the cost of performance may be effectu-
ated by: 
(a) enforcement of the principal obligor's duty of performance 
... ; or 
(c) subrogation of the secondary obligor to the rights of the 
obligee. 
See also RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 104 (1941): 
(1) Where the surety makes a payment or otherwise performs on de-
fault by the principal, or where the surety's property is used to satisfy 
the principal's duty, it is the duty of the principal to reimburse the 
surety to the extent of his reasonable outlay if 
(a) the surety's obligation has been incurred, or his property has 
been subjected to a charge, with the consent of the principal, or 
(b) the principal has assumed an obligation which was once the 
primary obligation of the surety. 
(2) Where a surety who has undertaken his obligation without the 
consent of the principal makes a payment or otherwise performs on 
account of the principal, it is the duty of the principal to reimburse 
the surety to the extent that the principal has been unjustly enriched. 
Subsection 104(2) could operate to compromise a waiver of the right to reim-
bursement contained in the terms of the guaranty agreement, so far as the 
Levit creditor requirement is concerned. See infra note 63 and accompanying 
text. 
Commentators have treated the rights to reimbursement, subrogation, and 
contribution at some length. See, e.g., JoHN HANNA, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON SECURITY 378-82 (2d ed. 1940); LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF SURETYSHIP, 165-264 (1950); ARTHUR A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURE-
TYSHIP 439-528 (5th ed. 1951). 
9. For a catalogue of the commentary hostile to Levit, see Jay L. West-
brook, Two Thoughts About Insider Preferences, 76 MINN. L. REV. 73, 73 n .2 
(1991). 
10. See, e.g., Donald W. Baker, Repayments of Loans Guaranteed by Insid-
ers as Avoidable Preferences in Bankruptcy: Deprizio and Its Aftermath, 23 
U.C.C. L.J. 115 (1990). 
11. Westbrook, supra note 9. Though the tone of this response at times 
may be somewhat aggressively argumentative, this article should not be read 
as demonstrating a lack of respect for either Professor Westbrook or his work. 
His article and its argument are provocative and provoke this response. 
12. Id. at 80-86. 
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as well.13 For Westbrook, Levit makes sense despite itself, or 
at least despite Judge Easterbrook's rationale. 
Westbrook is a good deal more considerate of the anti-Levit 
commentators and courts than I am. He does not offer the best 
defense for Levit and it is crucial that the case for the decision 
be made as convincingly as possible. Congress in the last year 
considered carefully and at great length amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code that would have overruled Levit.14 The 1992 
initiative failed15 but there is reason to believe that Congress 
will try again, and Levit is in jeopardy. Congress would evis-
cerate the rationale of the decision were it to save only so much 
of Levit as Westbrook suggests. Indeed, the forces arrayed 
against Levit might find much in the Westbrook argument to 
arm their attack. 
The limits Westbrook would graft onto the Levit doctrine 
are inappropriate and rely on insupportable distinctions. It is 
error to suggest that somehow an invisible, or at least unwit-
ting, hand of bankruptcy jurisprudence has trickled sufficient 
commercial reason down through the preference provisions to 
impose just the right limits on the logic of Levit. Essentially, 
the problem is that Westbrook posits what he deems the 
proper, defensible scope of Levit, and thereby delimits an im-
proper scope as well, excepting from the grasp of the Levit 
sanction a substantial number of instances that should be 
within the decision's proscription. 
Part I of this Article describes Westbrook's distinction be-
tween "true" guaranties and "pure-leverage" guaranties and re-
futes his argument that Levit provides a reliable means to 
distinguish the uncommercial consequences of the bad (pure-
leverage) guaranty from the commercial benefits of the good 
(true) guaranty. The distinction is ultimately ephemeral and 
has no meaning in insider preference law. Part II turns to 
Westbrook's defense of the accidental requirement that, in de-
termining the availability of Levit, it matters whether the in-
sider-guarantor is a "creditor" of the debtor by virtue of his 
retention of a right to reimbursement from the debtor upon 
satisfaction of the secondary obligation. I am certain that credi-
tor status is irrelevant to the calculus. 
13. Id. at 86-98. 
14. See irifra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
15. For the "scuttlebutt" about what may have "scuttled" the 1992 reform 
legislation, see Legislative Update: Why The Bankruptcy Bill Failed, BANKR. 
CT. DECISION WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Oct. 22, 1992, at A4. 
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It is first worthwhile to describe the frame of reference 
from which this response proceeds. A necessary predicate to an 
examination of any difficult fraudulent disposition law problem 
is an appreciation of the constructive fraud foundation of the 
fraudulent disposition provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Commentators, including Westbrook, have identified the two 
purposes of preference law: equality of distribution and reduc-
tion of the incentives for premature dismemberment of the im-
pecunious debtor.16 To effect these purposes, the preference 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code resonate with the principles 
of constructive fraud law.17 
The basis of constructive fraud liability is prejudice 
to the plaintiff (i.e., general unsecured creditors in bankrupt-
cy) without regard to the intent of the defendant (i.e., 
preferential transferee).18 Intent is irrelevant to the calcu-
16. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 76 nn.20-22; see also Report of the 
Comm. on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H. Doc. No. 137, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 213-13 (1973) (citation omitted) (describing three pur-
poses of preference law: ''First, it lessens the possibility of a scramble among 
creditors for advantage; second, it promotes equality [among creditor classes]; 
and third, it eliminates the incentive to make unwise loans in order to obtain a 
preferential payment or security."). 
17. In light of two recent bankruptcy decisions, there may be reason to be-
lieve that the constructive fraud nature of fraudulent dispositions law extends 
to equitable subordination under 11 U.S.C. § 510 (1988). The Massachusetts 
bankruptcy court in In re O'Day, 126 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991), avoided 
a leveraged business acquisition on constructive fraudulent disposition and eq-
uitable subordination bases without discerning an actual intent to defraud. Id. 
at 411-12. Thus, apparently, equity may intervene without a showing of the 
defendant-transferee's mala fides. Also, in In re Virtual Network Serv. Corp., 
902 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit recognized what commenta-
tors have dubbed "no-fault" equitable subordination. Id. at 1248-49; see also 
David G. Heiman et al., Case in Controversy: "No-Fault" Equitable Subordina-
tion .After Virtual Network- Lenders Take Cover or a False Alarm?, 1 J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAc. 208 (1992); cf. William Iselin & Co. v. Boardwalk Regency 
Corp., 703 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (reading the actual intent to de-
fraud section of New York's version of the U.F.C.A. to presume intent to de-
fraud from a conveyance made when grantor receives no consideration in 
return). 
For commentaries identifying the constructive fraud bases of fraudulent 
disposition law, see generally PETER A. ALcEs, THE LAw OF FRAUDULENT 
TRANSACTIONS 1\ 5.03[3] (1989 & Supp. 1992); Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding 
Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725 (1984). 
18. The focus of constructive fraud principles in generic misrepresenta-
tion or fraud law is the detriment the victim of a misrepresentation suffers 
rather than the benefit the fraud-feasor realizes. Some states have statutorily 
recognized causes of action for innocent misrepresentation. See, e.g., ALA. 
CODE § 6-5-101 (1977); CAL. Crv. CODE § 1573 (West 1982). Courts have also 
recognized causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, essentially imposing 
liability on a party in a position of trust upon whom the victim was entitled to 
HeinOnline -- 77 Minn. L. Rev. 610 1992-1993
610 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:605 
lus.19 Constructive fraud law proceeds from a decidedly norma-
tive foundation: as between two (or perhaps more) parties to a 
transaction, the victim of the constructive fraud should recover, 
but only to the extent that the victim is made whole.20 There-
covery does no more than restore the victim to its pre-tort 
condition.21 
Westbrook recognizes the constructive fraud nature of 
preference liability by concluding that preference law is "for-
mulaic";22 he does not, however, appreciate the consequences of 
this characterization. He argues that preference law is becom-
ing more and more formulaic23 notwithstanding the "normative 
rely. See, e.g., Crawford Painting & Drywall Co. v. J.W. Bateson Co., 857 F.2d 
981, 985 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1035 (1988); Hofstetter v. Fletcher, 905 
F.2d 897, 907 (6th Cir.); Roberts v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976, 983 & 
n.6 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978). See generally Alces, supra note 
17, 11 2.02[4]. 
19. See Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bank-
ruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 713,747-48 (1985): 
[W]e have finally come, in part by accident, to a voidable preference 
concept that abandons the English requirement of the debtor's culpa-
bility and our own former requirement of the creditor-defendant's 
culpability .... 
. . . . The function of the preference concept is to avoid preban-
kruptcy transfers that distort the bankruptcy policy of distribution. 
Transfers that do distort this policy do so without regard to the state 
of mind of either the debtor or the preferred creditor. 
At this same juncture, Professor Countryman questions whether preference 
law has any deterrent effect or in any real way assures equality of distribution. 
Id. at 748-49 & nn.188-92. 
20. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 552B (1977): 
(1) The damages recoverable for a negligent misrepresentation are 
those necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the pecuniary loss to 
him of which the misrepresentation is the legal cause .... 
(2) [T]he damages recoverable for a negligent misrepresentation do 
not include the benefit of the plaintiff's contract with the defendant. 
Courts finding negligent misrepresentation often award only "out-of-pocket" 
tort damages. See, e.g., Rosales v. A.T. & T. Information Sys., Inc. 702 F. Supp. 
1489, 1501 (D. Colo. 1988); Law Offices of L.J. Stockier, P.C. v. Rose, 436 
N.W.2d 70, 86 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); First Interstate Bank v. Foutz, 764 P.2d 
1307, 1309-10 (N.M. 1988). A few decisions, however, have sanctioned benefit 
of the bargain recovery in non-intentional fraud cases. See, e.g., Orsini v. Brat-
ten, 713 P.2d 791, 794 (Alaska 1986); Rose v. City of Covington, 634 S.W.2d 268, 
270 (Tenn. 1982). 
21. Because preference law only allows the trustee to recover the amount 
of the preferential transfer without imposing penalty on the transferee, even if 
the transferee intentionally exacted the preference, the preference provisions 
have little deterrent effect. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 85 n.49. 
22. "The term 'formulaic' refers to legal standards that are at once more 
definite and more arbitrary, more predictable and more inflexible." Id. at 90. 
23. See id. at 91 n.75. Professor Westbrook responds to the thesis devel-
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pull" of some of the exception provisions.24 The value of per-
ceiving preference law as increasingly formulaic, so far as West-
brook is concerned, stems from the cost savings accomplished 
by avoiding the litigation necessary to vindicate conceptions of 
justice.25 
The value of constructive fraud law, however, is not in the 
reduction of litigation for the sake of reducing litigation. Cer-
tainly constructive fraud produces cost savings, and such sav-
ings matter in bankruptcy law at least as much as and perhaps 
more than they matter in the law generally.26 The benefit of 
constructive fraud law is better results, or more justice more 
often than not.27 This may, in turn, pay dividends in reduced 
oped by Professor Robert Weisberg in his article, Commercial Morality, the 
Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. 
REv. 3, 116-29 (1986). Westbrook understands the Weisberg article to suggest 
that 
"scientific" [rules] and "moral" [standards] conceptions of preference 
will always remain in tension and that the latter repeatedly reemerge 
despite legislative efforts to apply mechanical rules. [Weisberg's] ar-
gument has considerable force, but I think it demonstrates a spiral 
rather than a circle, with preference law growing steadily more for-
mulaic despite the strong pulls in the normative direction. 
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 91 n.75 (citation omitted). 
Westbrook is certainly right: the spiral describes the evolution of prefer-
ence law more accurately than Weisberg's circle. But both commentators dis-
regard the fact that preference law is one part of the general fraudulent 
disposition law mosaic. It matters little to the trustee or lender what theory 
results in a transfer's avoidance. The most accurate graphic depiction of this 
area of the law might well require a set of interconnected spirals representing, 
alternatively, fraudulent transfer (state and federal}, equitable subordination 
and preference law. Dean Clark's important article supports this understand-
ing of fraudulent disposition circularity. See generally Clark, supra note 2. 
24. As an example of adjustments that reflect the persistent "normative 
pull," Westbrook cites the "cases under the ordinary course defense of 
§ 547(c)(2) where pressure from the creditor has been viewed as tending to de-
feat the defense." Westbrook, supra note 9, at 91 n.75. This could indicate the 
courts' eagerness to reach the right result on the facts before them rather than 
any statutory attraction to the normative. 
25. See id. at 96 n.90. 
26. The bankruptcy estate bears the litigation costs involving the estate's 
property. The trustee and the creditors therefore have an even greater inter-
est in avoiding protracted and costly litigation in bankruptcy. Litigation costs 
deplete the estate and may thereby reduce the recovery of the debtor's credi-
tors. Westbrook also recognizes this point. See id. at 83-84. 
27. Sales law governing express warranties provides a useful analogy. 
Under U.C.C. § 2-313 (1987), the buyer may prevail in a breach of express war-
ranty action by establishing that the seller's representation formed a "part of 
the basis of the bargain." U.C.C. § 2-313 (1987). It is not necessary for the 
buyer to establish that she in fact relied on the seller's representation. In try-
ing to distinguish ''basis of the bargain" from "reliance," (then Professor, now 
University President) John Murray observed that: 
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litigation as well. It is this type of litigation cost reduction that 
should be the object of constructive fraud law: the savings real-
ized because the rule formulates the most just result, the result 
otherwise obtained only through protracted litigation.28 
The Levit decision is fundamentally a case about the con-
structive fraud nature of preference law, fraudulent disposi-
tions law, and bankruptcy law generally.29 Therefore, perhaps 
[i]f business agreements could be invalidated by asserting a lack of 
reliance, a 'business man knowing, or sensing that [this] stood in the 
way of judicial relief would hesitate to rely on a promise in [a] case 
where the legal sanction was of signifi~ce to him.' Requiring proof 
of reliance, in effect, decreases reliance. 
John Murray, ''Basis of the Bargain": Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 
MINN. L. REV. 283, 319 (1982) (footnotes. omitted) (citing L.L. Fuller & William 
R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 62 
(1936)). 
28. Bankruptcy courts have discerned the constructive fraud nature of 
preference law. For example, in Graban v. McDowell Nat'l Bank (In re En-
gel), 96 B.R. 602 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989), the trustee attempted to recover as 
preferential the value of certain accounts receivable that "fed the lien" of the 
secured creditor within ninety days of bankruptcy. Id. at 603. In defense, the 
secured creditor objected that it had no idea that it was undersecured at the 
time the accounts became part of its collateral base. Id. The court dismissed 
that objection summarily: "The state of mind of a secured party is not rele-
vant. It is 'value' which is important." Id. 
That conclusion is further supported by the legislative history of the so-
called "no improvement of position test": 
The [test] sacrifices a great deal to simplicity of administration. It 
seeks to avoid complicated and expensive litigation by focusing the ju-
dicial inquiry on the situation as it existed on the two dates chosen as 
measuring points. . . . There has to be a straight policy choice be-
tween the rough and ready provisions of the [Code] (which, it is 
thought, will work reasonably well in all but the unusual case) and 
the desire to do justice case by case (which may require tedious, asset-
exhausting litigation in all cases). 
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 216 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6176. This observation confirms that preference law is 
animated by constructive fraud principles, in part because it is too expensive to 
more finely tune the equitable balance. 
Professor Countryman, after surveying the development of preferential 
transfer legislation in England and the United States, and considering espe-
cially the nature of insider preference liability, concluded that there is no good 
reason to condition the operation of the insider preference avoidance provision 
on the insider-transferee's state of mind: "A transfer to an insider-creditor by 
an insolvent debtor, like the debtor's transfer to any other creditor, is not any 
more or less a distortion of the bankruptcy distribution policy depending on 
the transferee's state of mind." Countryman, supra note 19, at 749. 
29. Similar "semaphore" cases in fraudulent dispositions law include 
United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied 483 U.S. 1005 (1987) (avoidance of leveraged business acquisition on 
constructive and actual fraud bases); Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Co., 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981) (valuation of direct and indirect benefits in 
cross-steam and upstream guaranties attacked as fraudulent conveyances); 
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even more than because of its impact on commercial lending, 
there is much at stake in the way we read Levit. In a world 
impatient for identification of and salvation by fundamental 
bankruptcy principles, 30 Levit seems to chart a course. The two 
parts of this Article proceed from a constructive fraud perspec-
Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (avoidance of 
real property foreclosure as constructively fraudulent conveyance). 
Bankruptcy scholars seem to have little trouble identifying the particular 
issue in which they are interested in a particular article as a kind of roman a 
clef of bankruptcy jurisprudence generally. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 23, 
at 11-12 ("Indeed, the legislative and judicial history of preference law be-
comes a medium for political debate over such [fundamental] questions . . . . 
[P]reference laws have inadvertently become symptoms of the instability of 
our commercial norms."); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The 
Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy 
Policy, 85 Nw. L. REV. 919, 938 n.59 (1991) ("[L]egitimate questions remain 
about the limits of the bankruptcy process. . . . [M]uch about the scope of 
bankruptcy policy can be learned by observing the courts' use of the good faith 
device in the decided case law.") 
30. A veritable cottage industry has sprung up offering alternative 
metatheories of bankruptcy. Two views have attained particular prominence. 
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 29, at 948-66, describe the "Traditional" 
and "Collectivist" views of bankruptcy. They trace the Collectivist view to the 
work of Professor Baird and Provost Jackson: 
"Collectivism," as we [Ponoroff and Knippenberg] use that term, 
should be taken to mean the set of shared fundamental assumptions 
and postulates of a group of scholars writing mainly from an econom-
ics-based perspective of the law. • . . For the Collectivists ... bank-
ruptcy serves a single purpose: it is a federal debt collection system. 
Accordingly, bankruptcy is properly invoked only in response to a 
common pool problem, a term Jackson uses to describe the situation 
created when a debtor's assets are insufficient to satisfy the demands 
of a common pool of claimants. The purpose of bankruptcy-or, to 
use Jackson's term, the 'first principle' of bankruptcy-is to serve as a 
debt collection device targeted to the common pool problem. 
Id. at 949-50 (footnotes omitted). 
They attribute the Traditional view to Professor Elizabeth Warren, partic-
ularly her article Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. C:m. L. REV. 775, 776 (1987). They 
describe her Traditionalism as recognizing 
that the financial collapse of a Il.rm presents questions of loss alloca-
tion and community interest simply not implicated in individual 
debtor-creditor disputes. For this reason, the Traditionalist believes 
that the bankruptcy system is and should be designed to address a 
broad range of interests affected by the collapse of a debtor enter-
prise. This broad range should include, but not consist exclusively of, 
the interests of creditors with unpaid state law claims. Brought 
within the bankruptcy process, diverse interests can be taken into ac-
count and, perhaps, protected and accommodated collectively under 
the auspice of the proceeding itself. 
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 29, at 960-61 (footnotes omitted). 
It would probably be worthwhile to test preference law against both of 
those views, as well as in terms of fraudulent disposition law generally. I re-
serve that endeavor, however, for another day. 
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tive to demonstrate the incongruity of both the true guaranty 
versus pure-leverage guaranty distinction and the use of the 
"creditor" requirement to distinguish among those guaranties 
within and those without the scope of Levit. 
I. DISTINGUISIDNG LEVERAGE FROM LEVERAGE: 
GOOD, BAD, AND UGLY GUARANTIES 
Westbrook describes two points at the ends of a guaranty 
spectrum, what I term a guaranty "ugliness continuum": the 
true (or good) guaranty and the pure-leverage (or bad) guar-
anty. The goodness or badness of a guaranty for Westbrook is a 
function of the lender's purposes in taking the guaranty: a 
product, then, of the lender's intent. The "more" the lender 
obtains the guaranty to gain access to the guarantor's assets, the 
better the lender's purpose and the less desirable it is, accord-
ing to Westbrook, to punish the lender for taking it. If the 
lender's motive in taking the guaranty is to obtain leverage to 
cause the guarantor to prefer the lender over the general credi-
tors, then the purpose is bad and preference law should deter 
such behavior.31 
Westbrook concludes that Levit, deus ex machina, will dis-
appoint the lender who takes the bad guaranty but will not 
similarly discomfit the lender who takes the good guaranty: 
The distinction comes into focus at the moment the lender pres-
sures an insider for payment in a time of financial stress. If the pay-
ment threatens the survival of the business, the true guarantor is 
likely to resist. If making the payment destroys the business, the true 
guarantor will be an irresistible target for an indirect-benefit prefer-
ence action by the trustee in bankruptcy. The guarantor's house and 
savings, or stream of separate income, will be seized for the benefit of 
the estate. The true guarantor's only hope to save these assets lies in 
resisting the lender's pressure and saving the business. 
By contrast, the pure-leverage guarantor may face a different 
calculus. The insider may believe that a suit by the lender for non-
payment is more likely than an action by the bankruptcy trustee for 
an indirect preference. . . . The lender also may be in a position to 
threaten future credit for the insider, a threat not available to the 
bankruptcy trustee. Thus, it seems quite plausible that the pure-lev-
erage guarantor will have more reason to react to lender pressure by 
preferential payment rather than by risking all on the success of the 
business.32 
Westbrook distinguishes the good guaranty from the bad guar-
anty by distinguishing the good lender from the bad lender: 
31. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 82-83. 
32. Id. at 83-84 (footnotes omitted). 
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the lender who takes the guaranty from a judgment-proof in-
sider does so to realize an improper, in terrorem effect. The 
lender who takes the guaranty from a judgment-worthy insider 
takes it for proper reasons, and should not be exposed to the 
Levit sanction. To draw that distinction, along lines of motive, 
contravenes the sense of constructive fraud law. The distinc-
tion is untenable because preference law is constructive fraud 
law. Westbrook cannot both acknowledge the formulaic nature 
of preference law and then so profoundly undermine his 
characterization.3 3 
The next two sections respond to Westbrook's distinction 
between good and bad guaranties by arguing that there is no 
reason to believe that the party liable on a good guaranty will 
be any less likely to cause the principal obligor to prefer the 
lender-obligee than would the party liable on a bad guaranty. 
In fact, just the opposite is true. Further, there are neither 
good nor bad guaranties; all guaranties are ugly. 
33. Westbrook does not draw his distinction along formulaic or construc-
tive fraud lines; it is instead an incarnation of the contract bargain model, a 
kinder and gentler incarnation perhaps, but based on the contract paradigm 
nonetheless. For the genesis of that model in the fraudulent disposition con-
text, see Baird & Jackson, supra note 2. For criticisms of the model, see gen-
erally David G. Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73 
(1985); Kathryn V. Smyser, Going Private and Going Under: "Leveraged 
Buyouts and the Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. L. J. 781 (1988); Ke-
vin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1987). 
Westbrook's argument echoes the contract bargain model: "The true-
guarantfy] commitment will maximize the chances of the business' success, to 
the benefit of all concerned." Westbrook, supra note 9, at 84. While that is 
certainly a laudable goal, and one not exclusively the province of contract 
principles, it implies the business would not realize a similar benefit if courts 
apply Levit more broadly than Westbrook suggests. At a time when Congress 
is looking for ways to respond to powerful lenders' interests, see infra notes 
93-97 and accompanying text, it is dangerous, and in fact inconsistent with fun-
damental fraudulent disposition principles, to argue that a limited operation of 
Levit will give effect to the ''bargain" that the victims of an insider preference, 
unsecured trade creditors, would have made with the debtor and its lender 
had they merely been invited to the table. 
Compare Carlson, supra, at 103 n.95 (commenting on the contract bargain 
model): 
This is all very irrelevant. Such a hypothetical agreement costs 
neither the debtor nor the creditor anything to make. The person 
who pays the bill under fraudulent conveyance law is the third party 
who may not retain a gift or dividend. Why should that party partici-
pate in a hypothetical creditor's bargain? An ex; ante reconstruction 
of what parties really want is rather worthless when it excludes the 
very parties who must bear the cost of the agreement. 
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A. PREsSURING THE JUDGMENT-PROOF 
In all the world there is nothing more timorous than a million dollars, 
except ten million. In revolutionary times the rich are always the 
people who are most afraid.34 
For Westbrook, a good guaranty vindicates two legitimate 
lender interests: first, greater protection for the lender, in the 
form of more assets (those of the insider-guarantor) supporting 
the loan to the debtor; and second, the insider's enhanced com-
mitment to her business, more "hard work and sacrifice"35 than 
the guarantor would have otherwise devoted to the success of 
the business. Yet 
[a] "pure-leverage" guarant[y] is a guarant[y] given by an insider who 
is not likely to be able to offset any shortfall in the debtor's perform-
ance .... The value of such a guarant[y] is primarily a matter of con-
trol over the debtor company through leverage on the insider. The 
insider will be anxious to see the guaranteed debt paid and will be 
vulnerable to pressure to see that it is.36 
When the guaranty operates in terrorem, it is illegitimate. 
Such a guaranty is not due the indulgence of preference law. A 
pure-leverage guaranty is bad because it does not serve a legiti-
mate commercial purpose.37 
Westbrook argues that as a matter of fact the lender who 
has taken a good guaranty will not be required to disgorge pay-
ments on the guaranteed debt. The party liable on the good 
guaranty will resist the lender's pressure, reinvigorate the 
debtor-business, and, in so doing, avoid bankruptcy altogether.38 
Such a guarantor, solvent and afraid of losing it all, or most of 
it, has all the right incentives. Were he to cause the debtor to 
prefer the lender, those payments would be recovered from 
34. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 1017 (Emily M. Beck ed., 14th 
ed. 1968) (citing Gerald White Johnson, American Freedom and the Press, 
1958). 
35. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 79. 
36. Id. at 80 (footnote omitted). 
37. The leverage on the true guarantor is merely the inescapable con-
sequence of the insider's decision to commit additional wealth to the 
business through the guarant[y]. In contrast, the leverage on the 
pure-leverage guarantor must consist of either the threat to seize as-
sets of great personal value to the insider, but of little intrinsic value, 
or the threat of being forced into personal bankruptcy. Both aspects 
of the pure-leverage guarant[y] are in terrorem pressures that are 
generally regarded as quasi-legitimate at best. It is not clear that 
commitment obtained on such a basis has much claim to policy consid-
eration. It certainly should not be considered of sufficient value to 
counterbalance the anti-dismemberment policy. 
Id. at 82-83 (footnotes omitted). 
38. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
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him as the party who benefitted from the preferential 
transfer.39 
Westbrook's argument depends upon the assumption that a 
judgment-proof guarantor, the party who, by definition, makes 
a bad or pure-leverage guaranty, will have more incentive to 
raid the business-debtor's coffers to prefer the lender than 
would the good, "judgment-worthy" guarantor, 40 the party who 
has assets exposed to the risk of either the lender's enforce-
ment of the guaranty or the trustee's recovery of the prefer-
ence in the debtor's bankruptcy. This may be a specious 
distinction. The guarantor's incentive could just as likely be a 
function of how much the guarantor has to lose, or how much 
the guarantor believes she has to lose, as it is a function of the 
guarantor's apprehension about personal bankruptcy.41 
Consider the nature of the threats that each guarantor con-
fronts. The lender threatens the guarantor, good or bad, with 
enforcement of the guaranty if the corporate debtor does not 
make certain preferential payments to the lender. The good 
guarantor may either succumb to the pressure and cause the 
preferential payments or resist the pressure and force the 
lender's hand. If the guarantor succumbs, the trustee will be 
able to recover the amount of the preferential payments from 
the guarantor. (If the trustee recovers instead from the lender, 
the lender may proceed against the guarantor on the guaranty.) 
If the good guarantor believes the probability the business 
will fail within one year is less than 1.0, 42 and that, therefore, 
there is less than a one hundred percent chance the trustee will 
prevail in the insider preference action,43 then the guarantor 
39. Recall that Levit nowhere requires that the trustee proceed against 
the initial transferee (the lender); the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee to 
recover from either the "initial transferee" or the creditor who benefitted 
from the transfer (the insider). 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988). Westbrook does, 
however, assert, without citing supporting authority, that "the bankruptcy 
trustee likely will seek recovery from the' [judgment-worthy] insider in the 
first place." Westbrook, supra note 9, at 81. 
40. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 80. 
41. The Bankruptcy Code and state exemption laws provide some protec-
tion against the type of extortion that Westbrook fears. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(d)(3) & (4) (1988); TEx. PRoP. CODE ANN.§ 42.002 (West Supp.1992); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Michie Supp. 1992). 
42. And Westbrook must allow that this would be the norm. 
43. The trustee will not prevail if the lender-transferee can identify an ap-
posite exception to preference liability. The exceptions are collected in 11 
U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988). Moreover, in Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527 
(1991), the United States Supreme Court held that courts may consider install-
ment payments made on long-term debt in the ordinary course of business and 
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may cause the debtor to make the preferential payment. In 
fact, the judgment-worthy guarantor, the guarantor who makes 
good guaranties, is always better off causing the corporate 
debtor to make the preferential payment because the 
probability of the guarantor's ultimate preference liability for 
the amount of the payment is always less than 1.0. 
The judgment-worthy guarantor, however, may be able to 
resist either forcing the preferential payment or paying on the 
guaranty. This is the scenario Westbrook foresees. He believes 
that the good guarantor will respond to the lender's threat by 
putting her shoulder to the grindstone. The good guarantor 
may, or she may not. If the guarantor does not so choose, the 
lender may decide not to enforce the guaranty either because of 
fluctuations in the economy generally, or simply because the 
lender is not interested in foreclosing on the guarantor's home 
after all. 
If the lender proceeds against the guarantor (or the guar-
antor believes the lender will proceed), then the potential cred-
itor, the trustee recovering an insider preference, is replaced by 
the very real creditor, the lender-beneficiary of the guaranty. 
The good guarantor may have more reason to fear this actual 
creditor than the specter of a trustee in bankruptcy. If we as-
sume you pay the creditor you fear the most, your mortgagee 
before the newspaper delivery service, the good guarantor will 
prefer the threat of a trustee in bankruptcy to the (at least per-
ceived) 1.0 probability, the reality of one hundred cents on the 
dollar satisfaction of the guaranty. 
Contrast the incentives that operate on the judgment-proof 
or bad guarantor on the pure-leverage guaranty. This guaran-
tor also confronts two creditors: the potential trustee in bank-
therefore insulate them from preference avoidance. Explaining the Levit 
sanction's limited utility, Judge Easterbrook anticipated the Walas decision: 
"To the extent that debtor paid on time, the creditor is protected by the cur-
rent version of§ 547(c)(2), the 'ordinary course' rule." Levit, 874 F.2d at 1200. 
Wolas, then, should shelter all payments made on a debt guaranteed by an 
insider so long as the payments were otherwise in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. See Barkley Clark, Scheduled Debt Payments as Preferences: Paradigm 
of the Plain Meaning Rule, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 7 (1991). 
Consider the limited circumstances in which a lender would fear Levit 
sanctions: only if the lender has taken an insider guaranty and receives more 
than the scheduled loan payments. If in fact the lender receives payments in 
an amount that takes them outside the scope of the ordinary course, is that not 
the best evidence that the debtor preferred the lender at a time when the 
debtor's financial condition was compromised? For a survey and discussion of 
the ordinary course of business exception cases, see ALcES, supra note 17, 11 
6.03[2). 
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ruptcy and the very real lender exerting preference pressure. 
In a world without Levit, the lender could exert that pressure 
with impunity, unconcerned with recovery beyond the ninety-
day preference period. The bad guarantor may be only too 
happy to oblige because the trustee would not be able to get 
blood from a stone; the bad guarantor, recall, is defined by his 
judgment-proof financial status. 
Post-Levit, however, the lender will know better than to 
try to pressure the bad guarantor because the trustee in bank-
ruptcy will recover the transfer from the lender. It matters lit-
tle if the lender does not know better. The trustee will reach 
the preferential payments in the hands of the lender anyway. 
This result, Westbrook argues, is appropriate because the bad 
guarantor, judgment-proof but curiously in fear of bank-
ruptcy,44 is more likely to cause the corporate debtor she con-
trols to make the preferential transfers than would the good 
guarantor who fears what may happen to his assets in the 
bankruptcy of the corporate-debtor. 
I agree with Westbrook that Levit provides the pure-lever-
age guarantor a means to respond to the lender's in terrorem 
pressure: "Threaten me or my company and I will take my 
company into bankruptcy so that the trustee can recover the 
payments you've been receiving for the last year." In addition, 
the bad guarantor will say something else to the lender: "I'll go 
into bankruptcy myself too, and discharge any liability I might 
have on that bad guaranty you made me sign." Indeed, per-
sonal bankruptcy may be the best friend of the pure-leverage 
guarantor. The availability of personal bankruptcy may give 
the bad guarantor the resolve to stand up to the lender who 
takes a bad guaranty and then tries to pressure the insider. To 
conclude otherwise we would have to know more about the 
"bankruptcy-averseness" of the particular judgment-proof guar-
antor. What Westbrook misses by focusing on the judgment-
proof guarantor's fear of personal bankruptcy is the way that 
impecunious status empowers rather than compromises both 
the guarantor and the debtor-corporation the guarantor 
"controls."45 
44. Indeed, bankruptcy may be the one place where the judgment-proof 
insider's meager assets will be relatively safe. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988 & 
Supp. III 1991) (providing the exemptions available to an individual debtor). 
45. The essence of the Bankruptcy Code's definition of an insider is "con-
trol." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (Supp. III 1991), particularly subsections (A)(iv), 
(B)(iii) & (vi), and (C)(ii) & (v). For a survey of the insider "control" cases, 
see generally ALcEs, supra note 17, 1! 6.02[5][c]; 2 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, CoL-
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According to Westbrook, the judgment-worthy guarantor 
will be less subject to lender pressure because such a guarantor 
knows that the trustee can recover any preference from the 
party benefitted, the true guarantor. He asserts, without elabo-
ration and without support, that "the bankruptcy trustee likely 
will seek recovery from the insider in the first place."46 When 
the lender exerts pressure, the solvent insider must decide 
whether to cause the debtor to pay the lender, and hope to 
avoid Levit liability, or resist the lender's entreaties and reha-
bilitate the debtor's business. 
Westbrook concludes that such a guarantor will stand tall, 
call the lender's bluff and resist pressure to cause the debtor to 
make preferential payments. I would suggest that, if there is 
greater or lesser pressure in either the good or bad guaranty 
settings, the lender may well be in the position to impose 
greater pressure on the good guarantor. The impecunious guar-
antor is not necessarily more subject to the lender's pressure 
than would be the judgment-worthy guarantor, who could have 
much more to lose. Westbrook has not given reason to con-
clude otherwise; he offers no empirical support for his 
conclusion. 
Therefore, because Levit actually may afford Westbrook's 
so-called bad guarantor more power to resist the lender than it 
does the good guarantor, the commentator's distinction would 
be untenable, if it were viable. Further, were his distinction 
the best, or even a plausible, argument in favor of the operation 
of the rule, the rule would be assailable. Congress might be 
able to find good reason in the Westbrook dichotomy to over-
rule Levit statutorily. The next section explains why West-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 101.31 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th ed. 1991 & Supp. 
1992). The Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel explained the nature of 
the insider inquiry under the Bankruptcy Code in Friedman v. Sheila Plotsky 
Brokers, Inc. (In re Friedman), 126 B.R. 63, 69-70 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (foot-
note omitted): 
First, the Code assigns insider status to entities or relatives of the 
debtor, or of persons in control of a related entity, whose affinity or 
consanguinity gives rise to a conclusive presumption that the individ-
ual or entity commands preferential treatment by the debtor. Second, 
insider status may be based on a professional or business relationship 
with the debtor, in addition to the Code's per se classifications, where 
such relationship compels the conclusion that the individual or entity 
has a relationship with the debtor, close enough to gain an advantage 
attributable simply to affinity rather than to the course of business 
dealings between the parties. 
46. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 81. 
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brook's distinction between good guaranties and bad guaranties 
is untenable. 
B. ALL GUARANTIES ARE UGLY 
According to Westbrook, a good guaranty is less likely, and 
the bad guaranty more likely, to be subject to Levit avoidance. 
In a footnote, Westbrook acknowledges that a guaranty's good-
ness and badness is a matter of degree: "Most guarant[ies] will, 
of course, partake to some extent of both types, especially as 
viewed prospectively. Nonetheless, the Levit rule will operate 
as indicated in the text to the extent that a guarant[y] is a true 
or a pure-leverage guarant[y]."47 All guaranties are "ugly" in 
terms of the true/good versus pure-leverage/bad dichotomy 
Westbrook formulates, if we understand "ugly" to mean no 
more than some combination of the good and bad.48 When a 
loan is closed and the guaranty executed, the guaranty may be 
good, the guarantor judgment-worthy. There would be no rea-
son to question the bona fides of the parties. The same could 
be true of a bad guaranty. At the time the loan is closed every-
one in the room knows that the guarantor is judgment-proof. 
Indeed, the lender and its counsel may even have some ques-
tion about the prospects of keeping the corporate debtor out of 
bankruptcy for a year. 
During the course of the credit relationship, however, 
things change. The guaranty that started out quite good goes 
through degrees of ugly until finally it becomes bad. The guar-
antor went from judgment-worthy to judgment-proof, maybe in 
the course of little more than a year. Contrast the perhaps less 
typical but certainly plausible converse, the guaranty that starts 
out very bad, improves to merely ugly, and finally achieves 
"good." During this metamorphosis the fiscal well-being of the 
47. Id. at 81 n.39 (emphasis added). Westbrook develops the same idea at 
82 n.41. 
48. The continuum, then, must be redrawn along axes. 
likelihood 
of 
avoidance 
good 
UGLY 
(b) 
(a) 
(c) 
bad 
Westbrook argues essentially that the more "bad" a guaranty is, the greater 
the likelihood that the trustee will recover a preferential transfer to the 
lender on account of the guaranty. The trustee will be more likely to "avoid" 
(recover from the lender) a guaranty as bad as (c) than she would guaranty (a) 
or (b). 
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corporate debtor may improve as well. Or the debtor's finan-
cial condition may deteriorate, perhaps in part because the 
guarantor is taking too much home and not reinvesting more in 
the business. 49 
There are obvious questions: when do we measure the 
goodness, badness, or ugliness? How do we measure? What do 
we do with the ugly guaranty, neither purely good nor purely 
bad, certainly the most typical form? The next three sections 
consider the questions seriatim. 
1. When to Measure 
Westbrook identified two legitimate reasons for taking the 
insider's guaranty: greater protection for the lender through 
increased assets supporting the loan, and enhancement of the 
insider's commitment through "nights and weekends" at the of-
fice. 50 Because Levit avoidability occurs at the time of the cor-
porate debtor's bankruptcy, the lender may avoid insider 
preference exposure despite the good commercial reasons of 
the lender when it first took the guaranty. If the object is to 
appraise the purity of the lender's intentions when it takes the 
guaranty, then applying Levit in the bankruptcy proceeding, 
perhaps long after the fact, may not be the way to do it. 
The lender who took a good guaranty "viewed prospec-
tively" may not deserve the Levit sanction if the guarantor's 
personal financial fortunes deteriorate between the execution 
of the guaranty and the bankruptcy of the corporate debtor. It 
is the financial condition of the guarantor at the time of the 
bankruptcy proceeding, however, that determines the insider 
preference exposure of the lender. At that time the trustee de-
cides whether to pursue the lender or the insider under section 
550(a)(l). 
2. How to Measure 
Westbrook uses the financial condition of the guarantor as 
a measure of the guaranty's, and lender's, goodness (the extent 
to which the lender took the guaranty for the right reasons: as-
sets and commitment). Assuming that it would be feasible to 
49. The guarantor's actions need not be so extreme that corporate laws 
would intervene to provide the bases to pierce the corporate veil. See gener-
ally STEPHEN B. PREssER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (1992). 
50. The phrase "nights-and-weekends commitment" is Westbrook's de-
scription of the type of commitment that legitimizes the true guaranty. See 
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 84. 
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determine the relative ugliness of a guaranty by reference to 
the judgment-worthiness of the guarantor, it is not enough to 
appraise that status in the abstract. "[I]t is a true guarant[y] if 
the guarantor is judgment-worthy for the full amount of the 
debtor's obligation."51 Thus, if the net worth of the guarantor 
is less than the debt the corporate debtor owes the lender, the 
guaranty is at least ugly, if not all bad. 
A:ny deficiency may be enough to make the guaranty all 
bad if what makes the guaranty bad is the lender's threat to put 
the guarantor into personal bankruptcy. The guarantor who is 
bankruptcy-averse is not more or less so because he is only a 
little bit insolvent. A debtor is not thrown "deeper" into bank-
ruptcy because she is "very" insolvent. 52 The stigma, to the ex-
tent that it provides leverage, is much the same no matter how 
impecunious the guarantor. 
What of the not atypical case in which a guarantor's net 
worth is less than the amount of the guaranteed loan? The 
lender may take a guaranty in order to dedicate additional as-
sets to the loan, even if those assets are not sufficient to cover 
the full amount of the outstanding indebtedness, and to assure 
the guarantor's commitment to the corporate debtor. Do that 
lender's bona fides differ substantially from the bona fides of 
the lender willing to make a loan to a corporate debtor whose 
principal has personal assets in an amount equal to or exceed-
ing the line of credit? It is possible to conclude that the lender 
making a loan to a less-than-judgment-worthy guarantor's busi-
ness has more faith in the transaction ab initio; the lender is 
willing to take some risk because the lender believes in the 
business and the guarantor. Why favor the lender who took a 
guaranty for the wrong reasons but turned out to have a judg-
ment-worthy guarantor after all over the lender who took a 
guaranty from a principal without the means to answer for the 
"full amount of the debtor's obligation"? 
The problem, ultimately, is that the guarantor's judgment-
worthiness at the time of the corporate debtor's bankruptcy is 
not a good proxy for the asset enhancement/ commitment legiti-
macy. But there are additional problems. 
51. Id. at 80. 
52. It is, of course, not necessary that an individual or a business be insol-
vent in order to become a "debtor" under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 301, 303 (1988). 
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3. What To Do With the Ugly 
A persistent challenge in all law is how to treat a case that 
is not at the polar extremes of a continuum. In preference law, 
the answer is to impose the sanction "to the extent" of the pref-
erence. 53 A preferential transfer is avoidable to the extent that 
the transfer enabled the transferee to receive more than it 
would have in a liquidation of the debtor.54 
Westbrook acknowledges that most guaranties are ugly, 
"partake to some extent of both [true and pure-leverage charac-
teristics],"55 but then he asserts that Levit will work to the ex-
tent that the guaranty is good or bad. The operation of the 
Levit rule, then, will be a function of the guaranty's ugliness, 
the extent to which the guarantor is judgment-proof or judg-
ment-worthy. We can construct the calculus. 
If a lender makes a $1 million loan to a corporate debtor 
and takes a guaranty from an insider with a net worth of 
$500,000, that guaranty is both good and bad, or truly ugly. 
When the corporate debtor goes into bankruptcy and the 
trustee attempts to recover the $100,000 in loan payments made 
during the year before the bankruptcy, the trustee, according to 
Westbrook,56 will proceed against the insider and the lender 
will avoid the Levit effect. The lender, however, does not de-
serve to avoid Levit completely. The lender only deserves to 
avoid Levit to the extent that the guaranty was good rather than 
bad. So to effect the result for which Westbrook argues, the 
trustee should recover only $50,000 from the insider and $50,000 
from the lender. 
The net worth of the guarantor compared to the amount of 
the debtor's obligation, the full loan, does not matter. The 
trustee will recover from the insider whatever the trustee can 
recover from the insider. The trustee will not stop at an 
amount equal to the ratio that the preferential payments bear 
to the relation between the net worth of the insider and the 
amount of the loan the lender made to the corporate debtor.57 
Westbrook has to use a comparison of the net worth of the 
53. Id. § 547(b)(5); see also id. § 547(c)(5). 
54. Id. § 547(b)(5)(A). 
55. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 81 n.39. 
56. See supra note 39. 
57. The relationships described in the text may be illustrated with con-
trasting formulae. Let "P" represent the amount of the voidable preference, 
''T" the payments made to the lender within one year of bankruptcy, "A" the 
assets of the guarantor, and ''L" the amount of the guaranteed indebtedness, 
the outstanding loan. Were Westbrook's understanding to be accurate, P = 
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guarantor with the amount of the loan in order to raise the 
specter of the guarantor's personal bankruptcy. It is that spec-
ter, the guarantor's exposure to and risk of personal bank-
ruptcy, that distinguishes the good from bad, the true from the 
pure-leverage guaranty. The comparison is convenient, but 
does not have the meaning on bankruptcy day that Westbrook 
urges. 
II. DISTINGUISIDNG CREDITORS FROM CREDITORS: 
THE IRRELEVANCE OF BENEFIT 
Because the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code did not have 
Levit in mind when they formulated section 550(1)(a), it is not 
surprising that a glitch appears when courts apply the provision 
to preferences benefitting insider-guarantors. Westbrook cor-
rectly reads Judge Easterbrook's opinion as imposing two re-
quirements: first, that the insider be a creditor of the debtor 
("creditor requirement"), and, second, that the insider be a 
creditor on account of the guaranteed indebtedness ("nexus re-
quirement").58 The creditor requirement comes from the lan-
guage of section 547(b)(1): "[T]he trustee may avoid any 
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property - (1) to or for 
the benefit of a creditor."59 Judge Easterbrook imposed the 
nexus requirement, the requirement that the creditor status re-
late to the guaranteed indebtedness, with regard to Levit avoid-
ance of the Internal Revenue Service's tax claim. The 
requirement has no foundation whatsoever in the Bankruptcy 
Code.60 The nexus requirement means no more than what 
Judge Easterbrook said it means. 
AIL x T. In fact, however, the trustee's recovery will be P = min [T,A]; that 
is, P = the lesser of T or A. 
58. In Levit, the trustee attempted to recover tax payments made to the 
Internal Revenue Service within one year of the debtor's bankruptcy by argu-
ing that had the debtor not made the payments, the individual principals of 
the debtor would have been personally liable. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1191-92. 
Judge Easterbrook concluded that while the benefit to the insiders from the 
debtor's payments to the I.R.S. was "obvious ... their status as 'creditors' is 
not." Id. at 1192. The insiders were not creditors with regard to the tax claim 
because the statutory provision fixing their personal liability did not provide 
the insiders a corresponding right to obtain reimbursement from the debtor on 
account of those payments. Judge Easterbrook reasoned that although tax law 
imposed a penalty on the insiders that would amount to personal liability, it 
did not constitute the imposition of liability for payment of the tax, with a cor-
responding right to reimbursement from the debtor. Id. 
59. 11 U.S.C. § 547{b)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). 
60. The terms of the nexus requirement cannot be found in § 547, § 550, 
or the Bankruptcy Code definition of "insider" in § 101(31). 
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Suretyship law provides a guarantor who discharges the 
principal obligation a right to reimbursement from the debtor, 
and subrogates the guarantor to the rights of the creditor 
against the debtor.61 Commentators critical of the Levit re-
sult62 and counsel for lenders who take insider-guaranties have 
discovered in those suretyship rights and in the curious Levit 
creditor requirement a means to circumvent Levit's sting. H 
the lender is liable only for the benefit to the insider-guarantor 
when the guarantor is a creditor of the debtor on account of the 
guaranteed indebtedness, the lender can avoid the Levit risk by 
destroying the guarantor's creditor status with regard to that 
guaranteed indebtedness. In that event, section 547(b)(l) will 
not be satisfied; the preferential payments did not benefit a 
"creditor" of the debtor, and section 550(a)(l) is only apposite 
after the elements of section 547(b) are established. 
In order to destroy the guarantor's creditor status, the 
guaranty agreements may be drafted to include express waivers 
of the guarantor's right to reimbursement or subrogation.63 In-
sofar as the existence of that waiver may actually increase 
rather than moderate the guarantor's exposure, such a guar-
anty certainly increases the risk Levit polices: the guarantor 
has a greater interest in causing the debtor to prefer the lender. 
The guarantor's only hope to remain whole is to cause the 
debtor to satisfy the guaranteed indebtedness. 64 
A Tennessee bankruptcy court reviewed such a waiver. 
The boilerplate in In re Fastrans, Inc. 65 was sweeping: the 
guarantor waived any and all common law, statutory, legal, and 
equitable rights arising in relation to the guaranteed indebted-
ness. 66 The court reasoned that for the trustee to utilize Levit, 
"he must establish that the insider-guarantor . . . has a 'claim' 
against the debtor arising from his obligations under the Guar-
61. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP, supra note 8, at§ 14. The 
apposite Reporter's Note cites LA. CIV. CODE ANN. ART. 3047 (West 1982) and 
Poling v. Morgan, 829 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1987). 
62. See supra notes 9 & 10. 
63. See, e.g., 2 PETER A. ALCES ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
TRANSACTION GUIDE § 16.18 (1988) ("Guarantor waives ... any right to subro-
gation against [Debtor] or contribution against any party liable with regard to 
the Liabilities."). 
64. See Peter L. Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation Rights and Conjuring Up 
Demons in Response to Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAw. 2151, 2156 (1990). It is unlikely, 
however, that a lender would enforce such a waiver provision after the debtor 
has paid the lender in full. 
65. 142 B.R. 241 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992). 
66. Id. at 243. 
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anty and is not just as [sic] a creditor of the debtor generally."67 
The trustee could not make that showing in light of the terms 
of the waiver. 
The Fastrans decision confirms that if form is not to pre-
vail over substance, if the policy Levit vindicates is substantial, 
the "creditor" requirement must be abrogated. Otherwise, it is 
unlikely the lender with the bargaining power to obtain the 
guaranty in the first place would be constrained to agree to the 
guarantor's terms.68 
Westbrook sets up a straw man model revision of section 
547(b)(l) to circumvent Levit's formal but insubstantial credi-
tor requirement: amend the subsection "to read 'to or for the 
benefit of a creditor or an insider.' "69 He then knocks it down 
by confusing the judicially-imposed nexus requirement with the 
statutorily-imposed creditor status requirement. Westbrook's 
argument proceeds from a hypothetical that reveals his 
confusion. 
Westbrook proposes a scenario in which the lender who 
has taken an insider-guaranty does not use its insider-leverage 
to cause payment of the guaranteed indebtedness; instead, the 
lender conditions provision of additional financing for a sepa-
rate, new project of the insider upon preferential payment of 
the guaranteed indebtedness.70 In the debtor's bankruptcy, the 
trustee cannot invoke Levit to recover from the lender71 be-
cause the guarantor "possesses no rights against the corporation 
regarding the debt (au contraire) and therefore lacks creditor 
status for the purpose of section 547.''72 Westbrook concludes 
that "[t]his example illustrates the useful role played by the re-
quirement that an insider be a creditor if a payment is to be re-
garded as an insider preference, despite the somewhat artificial 
and indirect nature of that role."73 
Westbrook errs both in his application of the Levit creditor 
status and nexus rules to his own hypothetical and, more fun-
damentally, in his analysis of the apposite commercial and pref-
erence policies. 
67. Id. at 245. 
68. Such waivers appeared in form guaranty agreements long before 
Levit. See 2 ALcEs, supra note 63, § 16.18. 
69. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 96. 
70. Id. at 93. 
71. Westbrook does acknowledge that other avoidance theories might be 
available to the trustee "[o]n other facts." Id. at 94. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
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A. PRESSURE AT THE NEXUS 
According to Judge Easterbrook's Levit tax holding, if a 
debtor has two creditors, A and B, the insider's guarantying re-
payment of the debt owed creditor A (and concomitant surety-
ship rights against the debtor if the insider discharges A's 
claim) does not satisfy the nexus requirement with regard to 
preferential payment of B's claim. Only if the insider had 
rights against the debtor in the event the insider paid B would 
the nexus requirement be satisfied with regard to the preferen-
tial payment to B. 
Westbrook's hypothetical, however, involves one lender 
and two loans. The lender applies pressure to the insider in the 
form of withholding financing of the second business unless the 
insider effects preferential payment of the first debt. In this 
case, Westbrook finds the nexus requirement not met and, in 
turn, the Levit creditor test not satisfied. Judge Easterbrook, 
however, nowhere described the nexus requirement in those 
terms. The Fastrans court formulated the nexus requirement 
nicely: 
[I]t is not enough that an insider be a creditor of the debtor in a gen-
eral sense; the insider must have a 'claim' against the debtor attribu-
table to the specific debt he or she guaranteed in order to render 
transfers· made by the debtor on account of that debt to the non-in-
sider transferee avoidable under§ 547{b).74 
In Westbrook's hypothetical, the insider does have a claim 
against the debtor attributable to the specific debt she guaran-
teed (the valuable suretyship rights). All that differs from the 
Levit non-tax facts75 is the form or nature of the pressure the 
lender (the non-insider transferee) imposes. Rather than 
threatening to enforce the guaranty, the lender in Westbrook's 
hypothetical "threatens" to withhold the financing of a sepa-
rate project. The nexus requirement does not relate to the 
form of the pressure, only its location. If the pressure is 
brought to bear by a lender holding the insider's guaranty, the 
nexus requirement is satisfied; Levit avoidance is possible. As 
far as the nexus requirement is concerned, there is no differ-
ence between a lender imposing a detriment (enforcing the 
guaranty) and withholding a benefit (additional financing for a 
new project). From the insider's perspective, a penny earned is 
a penny saved. 
The payment on the preferred debt to the lender in West-
74. Fastrans, 142 B.R. at 245. 
75. That is, the voidable preferential transfer in Levit. 
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brook's hypothetical would be avoidable as an insider prefer-
ence because the nexus requirement is met; the insider is a 
creditor with regard to the preferred debt payment and that is 
enough to satisfy the Levit tax holding. Further, not only 
would the resolution of Westbrook's hypothetical be the oppo-
site of what he concludes, it should be because the policy bases 
of the creditor requirement (if the requirement is read as 
strictly as Westbrook reads it) are nonexistent. 
B. "CORE" PREFERENCE CASES AND THE QUANTUM 
OF BENEFIT 
Westbrook finds that the creditor requirement operates to 
keep non-core preferential transfer cases outside the scope of 
Levit avoidance: "As the example [in the hypothetical] demon-
strates, the creditor requirement prevents the application of in-
sider-preference law to some circumstances where preference 
policy is very much involved. . . . [W]ithin the universe of cases 
involving insider-preference policies, the creditor requirement 
makes preference law applicable to core cases and inapplicable 
to marginal ones."76 The preceding section of this article re-
vealed that the creditor requirement would not, in fact, operate 
in the way Westbrook suggests on the facts of his own hypo-
thetical. Assume he was right about the creditor requirement's 
application to the case in which the lender imposes pressure on 
an insider by hesitating to make a new loan to the insider un-
less the insider-guarantor77 causes the debtor to prefer the 
lender. Is Westbrook then correct that there is good reason to 
exclude the facts of the hypothetical from the scope of Levit? 
No.7s 
Recall that the creditor requirement, as currently con-
strued in cases such as Fastrans, is wholly insubstantial. It pro-
vides a trap only for the unwary lender who does not know 
76. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 95. 
77. Judge Easterbrook also made the point that an insider preference may 
be recoverable from the lender even if the insider is not a "guarantor" of the 
lender's loan to the debtor: ''We hold ... that the preference-recovery period 
for outside creditors is one year when the payment produces a benefit for an 
inside creditor, including a guarantor." Levit v. Ingersoll Fin. Corp. (In re 
V.N. Deprizio Constr. Corp.), 874 F.2d 1186, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis 
added). The Westbrook "marginal" hypothetical would seem to fall squarely 
within the scope of that statement of the Levit holding. 
78. Furthermore, would it be worth saving the creditor requirement even 
as construed by Westbrook if the cost were decisions such as Fastrans, which 
protect the extortionist lender merely because the lender had the foresight to 
obtain a blanket waiver? 
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enough to get a formal, boilerplate waiver of the guarantor's 
rights against the debtor. Also, the breadth of the Bankruptcy 
Code's "creditor" definition79 suggests that it might not be all 
that difficult for a court to find that the waiver is personal to 
the lender. The next bankruptcy court could conclude that the 
waiver does not have the effect the lender intended. Although 
it might constitute a default of the guaranty agreement for the 
guarantor to prosecute suretyship rights against the debtor, the 
guarantor's covenant not to do so would not extinguish the 
guarantor's creditor status vis-a-vis the debtor.80 Even a dis-
puted "claim" is sufficient to support creditor status.s1 
It could be that the existence of a debtor-creditor relation-
ship with regard to the guaranty should be deemed a matter for 
the insider and the debtor to resolve irrespective of the lender's 
intercession. What then, would prevent the debtor, on the eve 
of its bankruptcy, after the lender has been receiving preferen-
tial payments for a year or more, from entering into a new and 
separate contract with the insider? The contract could provide 
that, in exchange for a peppercorn or two, the debtor agrees to 
indemnify the guarantor for any funds paid to the lender on 
the debtor's behalf as a result of the lender's enforcement of 
the guaranty. The insider would have little to lose and a lot of 
leverage to gain. Even the guaranty agreement's description of 
such a contract as an event of default may not be enough to 
sway the guarantor who, given the curious creditor require-
ment, would be in a position to expose the lender to preference 
liability literally with the stroke of a pen. 
Westbrook also suggests that the creditor requirement is 
valuable because it provides the bankruptcy court with the 
means to avoid the necessary indirect benefit valuations, were 
the Westbrook hypothetical not without the scope of Levit 
avoidance. He explains: 
Although only a proxy for the policy balance, the creditor re-
quirement is not adventitious. In the insider-guarant[y] case, the ben-
efit to the insider is directly linked, dollar for dollar, with the 
payment to the creditor. In the marginal [hypothetical], the benefit 
remains unquantified and relates only indirectly to the payment. The 
creditor requirement reflects the direct and quantified connection be-
tween the company's transfer and the insider's benefit in the insider-
79. 11 u.s.c. § 101(10) (1988). 
80. This is similar to but distinguishable from the argument, rejected in 
Fastrans, that the trustee was a third party beneficiary of the guaranty. In re 
Fastrans, 142 B.R. 241, 246 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992). See also RESTATEMENT 
OF SECURITY, supra note 8, at§ 104(1)(b). 
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (Supp. III 1991). 
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guarant[y] case. The absence of creditor status for the insider in the 
[hypothetical] reflects an indirect and unquantified relationship be-
tween payment and benefit.82 
631 
Because the creditor requirement would insulate some in-
sider benefit cases from Levit avoidance, 83 Westbrook contends 
"[t]he presence or absence of creditor status for the insider 
stands proxy for the strength and clarity of the relationship be-
tween transfer and benefit."B4 The requirement results in the 
exclusion of marginal insider cases from the Levit rule, and 
thereby avoids the additional uncertainty costs generated were 
the rule to apply irrespective of the insider's creditor status. 
"One cost would involve quantifying the benefit the insider re-
ceives to determine the amount of the voidable preference, be-
cause only the amount of the benefit should be avoidable. "85 
This, however, misses the central point of preference law: the 
amount of the transfer to the lender would be the amount of 
the preference, not the value of the benefit the insider realizes 
as a result of the preference. 
Though Westbrook may believe that only the amount of 
the benefit should be avoidable, there is nothing in the lan-
guage of section 547 to support that conclusion. The only refer-
ence to ''benefit" is in section 550(a)(1), but the provision does 
not define a preference; it only describes the parties from 
whom a preferential transfer may be recovered. Section 550 
nowhere provides that only the benefit may be recovered. 
Westbrook explains his curious textual use of ''benefit" in 
a footnote, that reads, in pertinent part: 
In the case of an insider payment, I conclude that a preference 
includes only the portion of the transfer that benefits the insider, and, 
therefore, the trustee should recover only that portion. Thus, given a 
$100,000 unsecured debt to an unaffiliated lender, an insider 
guarant[y] limited to $50,000, full payment of the debt six months 
before bankruptcy, and insolvency on the transfer date, the trustee 
would avoid only $50,000 of the $100,000 payment. Any other result 
would ignore the central role of the 'benefit' to the insider and would 
create a pointless distinction between making one or two payments.86 
Notwithstanding Westbrook's failure to support his reading of 
82. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 96 (footnotes omitted). 
83. Of course, insofar as Westbrook errs with regard to the operation of 
the creditor requirement on the facts of his own hypothetical, his argument 
that the requirement's operation on his hypothetical facts reveals its inherent 
good sense is certainly suspect. 
84. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 96. 
85. Id. (emphasis added). 
86. Id. at 96-97 n.91, which also contains a cross-reference to n.28. Neither 
footnote cites any authority for that curious reading of the statute. 
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the section 550 benefit language as the measure of the section 
547 avoiding power with any case law, statutory law, or com-
mentary, there is a more fundamental deficiency. Preference 
law focuses on the value transferred from the debtor to the 
preferred creditor rather than on the benefit the insider-benefi-
ciary realizes because the value transferred is the precise 
amount of the detriment the other creditors of the debtor-
transferor suffer. 
Further, the difficulties of insider benefit valuation, which 
Westbrook cites to justify his exclusion of marginal from core 
insider preference cases, are nonexistent when the focus is on 
the amount of the transfer to the lender. Even though that 
correction responds to Westbrook's discovery of a valuation 
problem in order to support his means to circumvent it, the cor-
rection obscures a fact of preference law life: valuation issues 
are built into the preference law. 
The valuation uncertainties are incorporated largely into 
the subsection 547(c) exceptions.87 The incorporation is appro-
priate because after the trustee has established the elements of 
a preference, the burden shifts to the creditor to establish an 
applicable exception.88 Westbrook's misreading of the statute 
denies the role of valuation in preference law and concludes 
that valuation of an insider benefit should be precluded because 
it is difficult. In so concluding, Westbrook confuses the relative 
burdens of proof imposed on the trustee and transferee: "In 
our example, the qualification of the payment as a preference 
would necessitate valuing the benefit of the shopping-center fi-
nancing to [the insider-guarantor], which is not an easy task."89 
Westbrook essentially reverses the preference analysis by 
replacing valuation of the transfer with valuation of the benefit 
and then contending that because valuation of the benefit is in-
herently problematic, there must be something wrong with a 
principle that would require valuation of the benefit. He is 
right, to an extent. There is something wrong with a principle 
requiring valuation of the benefit to an insider-guarantor, but it 
is Westbrook's principle that is wrong, not the Bankruptcy 
Code's. Succinctly, Westbrook greases the slope and then com-
plains that it is slippery. 
It may be that Westbrook fully understood that his focus 
87. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988). This is particularly true of subsections (c)(4) 
("new value" exception) and (c)(5) ("no-improvement-of-position" exception). 
88. Id. § 547(g). 
89. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 96-97. 
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on benefit was innovative, and would represent a sea change, 
disconnected from the current formulation of sections 547 and 
550. If this were his understanding, then his article could have 
offered a comprehensive argument for the thesis. It is curious, 
however, that Westbrook would bury a proposal to redraft the 
two crucial insider preference provisions within two intercon-
nected footnotes, and do so summarily.90 
CONCLUSION 
The preference wars continue unabated, and those with an 
affection for logic in the law, or at least some sense of norma-
tive symmetry, take sides in the battle between standards and 
rules.91 It may be that Heisenberg has more to say on the mat-
ter than either Westbrook or Alces.92 Meanwhile, Congress 
waits for no law professor, not even so far as Levit is concerned. 
Throughout 1992, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees 
worked on bankruptcy reform legislation, although nothing as 
radical as the 1978 Act, just a snip here, a patch there. Ulti-
mately and fortunately, Congress failed to pass the legislation 
that came out of committee, legislation that would have over-
ruled Levit. 
The first version of Senate Bill 1985 would have abrogated 
Levit by amending section 547 to add a new paragraph: 
(8) if the transfer sought to be recovered to an insider is on account of 
goods or services sold and delivered to the debtor in the ordinary 
course of business and the transferee is deemed to be an insider under 
section 101(31) solely because the transferee holds a guaranty of pay-
ment or performance from another insider of the debtor.93 
90. Westbrook's cryptic footnotes 28 and 91 leave open more questions 
than they answer. For example: how do we measure benefit in those cases 
certainly within the scope of 547(b)? If we do not value benefit in all of those 
cases, how do we distinguish those preference actions in which we focus on 
insider-benefit from those in which we focus on the value of the transfer? 
Would the benefit test work in all preference settings, or just in insider-guar-
anties? What result when the insider's real benefit is nil but the lender-trans-
feree's is great, as might be the case when a judgment-proof insider causes the 
debtor to effect a preference? In such a case, the insider receives no or virtu-
ally no benefit, so a valuation of benefit analysis suggests there would be no 
preference. According to the first part of his article, this is the setting in 
which Westbrook would most urge Levit avoidance. Westbrook, supra note 9, 
at 78-86. 
91. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 379 
(1985); see also Westbrook, supra note 9, at 90 n.69 and Weisberg, supra note 
23. 
92. For an accessible discussion of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, 
see generally STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HisTORY OF TIME 53-61 (1988). 
93. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1991). 
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Justice Holmes recognized that "(i]gnorance is the best of law 
reformers."94 That might explain why the first version of Sen-
ate Bill 1985 is unresponsive to the formal Levit problem, yet 
scores a direct hit at the foundation of Levit. The insider-
guarantor problem is a problem of control, in the subsection 
101(31) sense: the capacity to "control" is the bottom line of 
the Code's definition of an insider.95 Judge Easterbrook's opin-
ion in Levit understands that the creditor who controls the in-
sider of the debtor controls the debtor.96 So it is not surprising 
that when Senator Howell Heflin's staff first tried to undo 
Levit, the product focused on the crucial issue: control. Who 
could blame the staff, or Senator Heflin, for not knowing any 
better?97 
This response to Professor Westbrook has not been di-
rected to a defense of Levit. Though I believe the Levit doc-
trine is defensible, the focus here has been more on revealing 
the incongruities of limiting the breadth of Levit. Perhaps this 
94. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
Belknap Press 1963) (1881). 
95. See generally Peter A. Alces & Luther M. Dorr, Jr., A Critical Analy-
sis of the New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 527, 551-
57. 
96. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1194-95. 
97. The second reform bill approach to Levit proceeded from a different 
perspective. The proposed amendment of section 550(b) provided: 
The trustee may recover under subsection (a) a transfer avoided 
under section 547(b) from a first transferee or an immediate or medi-
ate transferee of a first transferee only to the extent that -
(1) all the elements of section 547(b) are satisfied as to the first 
transferee; and 
(2) the exceptions in section 547(c) do not protect the first 
transferee. 
S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 204 (1992). 
That version effectively avoided the impact of section 550(a)(1) in the 
insider-guaranty context by using a two-transfer buffer (see Levit, 874 F.2d at 
1195-96) to distinguish the transfer to the lender from the benefit that neces-
sarily inures to the insider-guarantor. Though no more defensible in terms of 
preference policy, this version did respond directly to the Levit holding. 
The final version also amended section 550 rather than section 547, this 
time by adding a new subsection (c): 
(c) H a transfer made between ninety days and one year before the 
filing of the petition -
(1) is avoided under section 547(b) of this title; and 
(2) was made for the benefit of a creditor that at the time of such 
transfer was an insider; 
the trustee may not recover under subsection (a) from a transferee 
that is not an insider. 
S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (1992). 
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will reveal the immanent good sense of Judge Easterbrook's 
opinion. 
Westbrook's article was both a defense and a refutation of 
Levit. Westbrook's analysis of Levit fails because he miscon-
strues the operation of preference policy in the commercial 
guaranty dynamic. The fact that Westbrook must contort Levit 
to make it work in his model suggests that either his model is 
bad or Levit is bad. By demonstrating the incongruities of his 
model, I hope to have established that the case against Levit 
has yet to be made, even by those who would damn it with faint 
praise. 
